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Introduct ion
In 1991 and 1992, the NUM accepted basic wage increases on the 
gold mines that were far below the annual inflation rate because 
of the crisis in the industry. The priority of the union was to 
preserve employment.
But this left the door wide open for rich mines (like Kloof, 
Elandsrand and Vaal Reefs) to h i de beh i nd the low increases that 
are set in the Chamber negotiations at levels that Freegold, 
BuffeIsfontein and marginal mines can live with.
The NUM decided that workers need a way of adding more money onto 
their wages If the mines can afford to pay more.
The ideal is for a national wage policy in which the richer mines 
-g^an help the poorer mines to pay the same wages. But this will 
mean new tax laws, new ownership rules and a new government to 
force it all through.
Right new, the union needs a special policy for collective 
bargaining in an industry that is in long term decline. The 
economy is not growing, few new mines are opening, so workers who 
get retrenched are threatened with starvation. NUM has already 
accepted a reduction in real wage standards to slow down the 
speed at which mines are contracting.
This leads to two separate, but related questions:
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1. At what point should the NUM stick in its heels and 
demand that the buying power of wages is preserved? 
[In 1993, this would mean a 12% increase just to fight 
inflation and stop the erosion of the buying power of 
bas i c wages.]
2. How can the NUM make sure that mines that can afford 
to pay more money to workers do so?
The first question is not addressed in this assessment. The
focus here is on the second question.
The Performance Bonus Scheme and its Rejection
In 1991, the NUM agreed to two mechanisms that might supplement 
basic wages with four mining houses. There was a Gold Price
Bonus which provided for a payment of up to 1% of basic wages, 
should the gold price rise above a certain level. A Performance 
Bonus Scheme, based on meeting targets to improve on the cost per 
kilogram of gold produced, paid out monthly amounts that varied
from zero to over 25% on basic wages. The gold price never
reached close to the bonus levels, however, and many mines acted 
in bad faith in the Performance Bonus Schemes. They increased 
their productivity and profits, manipulated targets and failed to 
pass on a fair share of the benefits to workers.
The Performance Bonus System was debated and rejected at the 
meeting of the NUM Central Committee in January 1992.
The 1992 Central Committee re-affirmed the NUM wage policy and 
stated that bonus schemes play absolutely no role in the wage 
philosophy of the NUM. The NUM policy is a living basic wage for 
all mi neworkers.
But the 1992 Central Committee recognised that there are severe 
problems in applying the wage policy strictly in the gold mines 
at present. The Central Committee directed the NUM Collective 
Bargaining Department to organise a workshop to come up with an 
a IternatIve to the performance bonus on the gold mines.
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The 1992 Workshop on Alternatives
In April 1992, 22 worker delegates and 18 full time officials 
attended a workshop that produced guidelines for a new strategy. 
This was presented to the NUM National Executive Committee (NEC) 
and there were then report backs in all the affected regions.
The recommendation was to demand profit sharing on all the gold 
mines, whether sick or healthy. When mines make a profit, they 
should share some of the profit directly with the workers.
The 1992 negotiations on profit sharing
It took six negotiating meetings before the Chamber of Mines 
agreed to discuss the new NUM proposal of profit sharing. In 
1991, one of the problems with the performance bonus scheme was 
that is was formulated in a tiny "working party" of only five 
people. In 1992, discussions were conducted in a forum in which 
all affected mines were represented and which NUM officials from 
the relevant regions attended. And regular reports were given to 
the full negotiating team, to the NEC and to the regions.
Over 100 pages of reports were distributed during the 
negotiations. Report backs were difficult to manage because the 
issues were often very complicated.
Results of the negotiations
1 . Mines that are excluded from profit sharing
Gold Fields and AngIovaaI refused to share their profits at 
all. Instead they gave an extra basic wage increase of 1*. 
JCI’s Sir Albert Robinson Hospital forced NUM to accept a 
continuation of the Performance Bonus Scheme. This is 
because the hospital is part of Randfontein Estates where 
NUM is not recognised and the white unions like the 
performance bonus. St Helena and GrootvIe i are making very 
little profit. The negotiating team accepted an extra 1,5% 
basic increase at these mines, with no profit share.
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2. The Chamber Agreement
The NUM has signed an agreement with the Chamber of Mines 
that sets a framework for the profit sharing schemes at 
individual mines. This includes certain rules and
guarantees and it defines how the profit share that goes to 
the workers is distributed between the workers. All profit 
sharing schemes accept the following principles:
2.1. the right of the NUM to negotiate a fair wage structure 
at industry level;
2.2. Security of employment - a guarantee that no worker 
will be retrenched or downgraded because of the profit 
sharing scheme
2.3. Improvements in health and safety measures - better 
efficiencies must not be achieved at the expense of 
more accidents.
2.4. Full disclosure of information to workers and the union 
to monitor the scheme
2.5. Worker participation in setting targets, monitoring the 
scheme and in the promotion of better efficiency.
2.6. No race or gender discrimination
2.7. A commitment to training - training is critical for^ a 
long term improvement in the viability of the mines. 
All mines must specifically investigate how better 
training can lead to better efficiency.
2.8. A fair distribution of gains between workers - at least 
the first R25 or 25* of money available for 
distribution in any performance bonus scheme, will be 
shared equal 1y amongst the workforce. Any additional 
amount will be shared in proportion to basic earnings.
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The Steps In Profit Sharing
1 PROFIT 
GENERATION
R E V E N U E  (money from sales) 
m  I n u s  C O S T S  (wages, stores ..)
e q u a  I s  P R O F I T  (surplus)
2 PROFIT 
DIVISION
Normally, the surplus Is divided three ways:
* Capex - capital expenditure, a re-lnvestment by 
the mine owners to keep the mine going
* Tax - paid to the government
* Dividends and royalties - cash given to the mine 
owners
But under profit sharing, the surplus Is divided four 
ways:
3*C O A R  E X
*C T A X
a*e D I V I D E N D S  & R O Y A L T I E S
9*C P R O F I T  S H A R E P O O L  - the cash
given to workers
3 PROFIT POOL 
DISTRIBUTION
The profit sharing agreements cover how the size of 
the profit share pool is calculated
Once the amount of surplus for workers Is decided, we 
then have to decide how to distribute the workers’ 
"profit share pool" between them all.
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D t s r e i s u T v ^ -
Rule 2.8 in the Chamber agreement spells out how the 
profit pool is distributed between the workers.
Profit ^ o o \
S i z e s
The rules of each scheme determine the size of the 
"profit pool" that is to be distributed amongst the 
workers.
If the pool is.smalj, all workers will share equally 
in the whole profit pool. The profit share will be, 
say, R19.74 per month, like at Blyvoor in December
1992
If the pool is very big, one quarter of the pool is 
shared equally between the workers. The remainder is 
shared according to salary, as a percentage of the 
basic wage. The profit share will be, say R116 per 
month, plus 14,2% of the monthly basic wage, as at 
Elandsrand in December 1992.
If the pool is medium sized, all workers will get R25 
per month. Any money that is left over after paying 
the equal share will be shared according to salary, as 
a percentage of the basic wage. The profit share will 
be R25 plus 2,06% of the monthly basic wage, as at 
Western Deep Levels in December 1992.
So the profit share will always be distributed as:
5> an equal rand amount '
plus [1f the profit pool is medium sized or very big] 
a percentage on basic earnings.
The mines will deduct capital expenditure from the profit 
before it is shared. This is money that the owners re­
invest in the mine.
But the details of the profit sharing schemes were then 
negotiated, comprehensively, in three separate forums - one 
for Anglo American, one for Blyvoor and one for Gengold.
H U M  C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a i n i n g  D e p a r t m e n t 6
3. The Group-Level Agreements
These negotiations were tough and drawn out. Initially, the 
employers did not want to share profits with workers until 
they had taken enough profits for their shareholders first!
* In all the schemes, profits are shared from the first rand. 
Whenever a profit is made, however small it may be, part of 
it goes to the workers.
* All the schemes apply right across the mining house 
concerned. The employers first wanted special negotiations 
for each mine, but a uniform group approach for all the 
schemes was agreed to. [Except for Randgold - because the 
Harmony profit sharing scheme was negotiated in 1991].
But the schemes do differ between the mining houses - and 
they are complicated, some more so than others.
3.1 RANDGOLD - SIMPLE SCHEMES FOR HARMONY AND BLYVOOR
+ Every month, the mines calculate the total profit and
deduct capital expenditure.
+ From what is left, the mines takes 20 cents from every 
rand and put it into the profit pool for workers.
+ The pool has a maximum size.
Blyvoor will stop sharing profits when the pool is 
equal to 20* of the total wage bill on the mine.
Harmony will stop sharing profits when the pool has R4 
million in it - this is about 29* of the basic wage 
bill. At Harmony, the first R1 million of the profit 
is shared equally between workers. This works out to a 
maximum "equal rand share" of R80 per worker.
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3.2 ANGLO AMERICAN - TWO STAGE SHARING
+ Every 3 months, the mines calculate the total profit 
and deduct capital expenditure.
+ What is left is divided into two parts:
Part 1 is money up to a "trigger" level - at Western 
Deep Levels this is R21,4 million per quarter. The 
mines take 5 cents from every rand of profit below the 
trigger level and put it into the profit pool for 
workers at each mine.
Part 2 is money above this “trigger" level. If the 
profit of a mine is more than the trigger level, the 
mine now takes 20 cents from every rand of this extra 
profit and puts it into the profit pool for workers.
So the profit pool is first fed by a weak stream, it is 
just a trickle in fact; but when the trigger level is 
reached, the stream becomes four time stronger!
+ The pool has a maximum size. The Anglo mines stop 
putting money into the workers’ profit pool when it is 
equal to 25* of the wage bill of the mine.
+ Trigger profit levels for Anglo Mines
Trigger Level 
R 5 1 ,7 million 
R 6 9 ,2 million 
R 2 1 ,4 million 
R10,9 million
Mine
Vaal Reefs 
Freegold 
Western Deep 
Elandsrand
*^7 N U M  C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a i n i n g  D e p a r t m e n t 9,
3.3 GENGOLD - TWO STAGE SHARING AFTER TAX ± R 2 . BLACKS ONLY
+ Every 3 months, the mines calculate the total profit 
and deduct capital expenditure AND tax paid to the 
government.
+ What is left is divided into two parts:
Part 1 is money up to a "trigger" level - this is the 
average profit for the preceding 4 quarters. The mines 
take 5 cents from every rand of profit below the 
trigger level and put it into a profit pool.
Part 2 is money above this "trigger" level. If the 
profit of a mine is more than the trigger level, the 
mine now takes 20 cents from every rand of this extra 
profit and puts it into the profit pool.
+ Now this combined pool is itself divided into two. 
Gengold only pays the profit share to black workers in 
categories 1 to 8 - so about two thirds of the pool is 
set aside to pay to "participating workers". The 
remainder, equal to the proportion of white wages in 
the total wage bill, is kept by the mine. Whites do 
not share in profits directly - they accepted a 1,5% 
increase in basic wages.
+ The pool has a maximum size. The Gengold mines stop 
putting money into the workers’ profit pool when it is 
equal to 15% of the wage bill of the mine.
+ When mines pay profit shares, Gengold adds on an extra 
R2 per month.
+ Gengold’s participating mines:
Marievale Unisel
Kinross Beatrix
Winkelhaak Bracken
Buffelsfontein Leslie
Stilfontein
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Table 1: Basic Results: PROFIT SHARING - JULY TO DECEMBER 1992
This table shows the total "equal rand shares" paid out in the 
six months from July to December 1992 [column 1] and the size of 
the shares (if any) paid out as a percentage of basic pay [column 
2].
PAY-OUT FORMULAE 
Co 1umn 1 PLUS Column 2
Mine Period Equal rand Equal %
[months] ' share share of
period 
basic pay
Anglo American
Vaal Reefs 6 R126 0.26*
Freegold 6 R104 0.75*
Western Deep 6 R96 1.03*
Elandsrand 6 R348 9.60*
Randgold
B1yvoor 6 R70 0.13*
Harmony 6 R146 0.08*
JCI [Performance Bonus]
Sir Albert Rob. 
Gengold
6 R150 4.17*
Marievale* 6 R 1 11 5.86*
Kinross 6 R112 0.00*
Wi nkelhaak 6 R 1 12 0.22*
Buffels 6 R155 0.45*
Stilfontein* 6 R202 5.10*
Uni sel 6 R148 1 .25*
Beatrix 6 R 1 11 0.46*
Bracken 6 R150 8.05*
Leslie 6 R150 0.55*
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performance at the mine level will not solve the structural crisis in 
the gold mining industry. At best, they can provide a breathing space.
The NUM is committed to negotiating and working towards a re-structured 
mining industry that combines long-term economic viability with the 
humane treatment of all its workers. This will involve effective state 
intervention in the mining industry to regulate the down-scaling 
process. The NUM needs to step up its initiatives In the mining summit, 
with the present government and with the ANC and COSATU, to secure a 
coherent, pro-worker mining policy for the new South Africa.
But a re-structured mining industry will also need to provide a proper 
role for trade unions and for workers in decision making.
Profit sharing schemes have opened up access to information. They have 
the potential to create a basis for extending, first participation and 
then control within the work environment. The monitoring of profit 
sharing schemes can be used to develop a deeper understanding in members 
of how things work on the mines.
Understanding is the first condition for effective participation. The 
NUM will investigate further demands for participation - such as 
directors on the management boards of companies, for example. And if 
workers, through profit sharing, get a share of the surplus like the 
shareholders, should they not also get ownership rights In the mines?
Summary
The 1993 Central Committee endorsed a four-pronged medium term strategy for 
the gold sector that Includes profit sharing as a major element:
* Fair basic wage increases in line with the NUM Wage Policy.
* Profit sharing schemes improved and extended to all gold mines.
* Political moves: State intervention; summit; Alliance policy.
* New initiatives to empower workers and unions In the workplace.
D: \N IC \P R0 SH R4 - Fe bruary 14, 1993
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The wav forward
The 1993 Central Committee considered numerous problems that have accompanied 
the Introduction of the profit sharing schemes. These include the lack of 
shaft-steward education and poor monitoring arrangements; attempts by 
employers to use the profit sharing schemes to confuse and divide workers; and 
worker suspicion of a scheme that is favoured by management. It was agreed 
that all these problems, while they merit urgent attention, are side-effects 
of the way profit sharing is implemented. None stand in the way of NUM using 
profit sharing as a strategy in the gold industry while it is in a down- 
scaling phase.
The following steps were agreed upon:
1. The NUM will demand the extension of the profit sharing schemes to a 11 
gold mines, including Anglovaal and Gold Fields.
2. The NUM will demand that the existing profit sharing schemes continue to 
operate - the profits mines make in the next 2 years are directly the 
result of the sacrifices of our members over the last two years. The 
members must share part of the profits.
3. The NUM will seek to negotiate improvements in existing profit sharing 
schemes: - eliminate the "trigger levels"; eliminate the "caps" that 
stop profits being shared above a particular level.
4. Most important: The NUM wi 11 put more resources into training shaft 
stewards at mine level to understand and monitor the profit sharing 
schemes. The mines must also allow time off for specialised training 
for shaft stewards who are charged with the task of monitoring the 
schemes. The profit sharing schemes are complicated, but so is the 
world we live in. To get the maximum benefit from the schemes, the NUM 
needs to develop skills at mine I eve I.
6. Beyond profit sharing
Profit sharing is a useful strategy to deal with the pressing problems 
that workers on mines face now. It preserves centralised bargaining, it 
allows flexibility in payments to workers to take account of the 
problems of particular mines and it also promotes the workers’ interest 
in increasing mine profits. But measures to enhance efficiency and
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4.3 Overal I Assessment of the Profit Sharing Schemes
QOOO POINTS /  SUCCESSES
1. Profit sharing schemes did provide a few extra rands for our 
members, as was their aim.
2. The profit sharing schemes, in their first six months, provided
better returns than the two 1* extra basic wage Increases given by 
Gold Fields and Anglovaal in 92 and 93
3. Profit sharing provides some flexibility to take account of the
special conditions at Individual mines. It can get members more 
money, while it preserves centralised bargaining and a "platform" 
of basic wages in the Industry.
BAD POINTS /  PROBLEMS
1. Education around the profit sharing schemes has not been
sufficient. They are very hard to understand and this is creating 
a lot of confusion still.
2. The payouts very enormously between mines, both in rands and
percentage terms. Workers who do the same Job, but under 
different companies don’t get the same profit shares.
3. The payouts vary from time to time. Workers cannot count on that 
extra money until they have It.
SURPRISES
1. Some of the worst mines, like Marievale, Stllfonteln and Bracken, 
paid the best profit share amounts
2. Some good, solid mines with long lives, paid very little indeed. 
(In general the wealthy Anglo mines paid a much less generous 
profit share than the struggling Gengold mines!)
3. The JCI performance bonus scheme at Randfonteln has paid out 
bonuses every single month, at one of the highest rates.
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4.2 Comparison In percentage terms
After half a year of the profit sharing schemes, we can calculate the 
amount of extra money workers have got. (See Table 2).
Let us compare the monthly average profit share payout In the last six 
months of 1992, with the average basic monthly wages in 1991.
This is done most easily by calculating what percentage the profit share 
Is of the 1991 basic wage.
These figures are given In Table 5 for Grade 4 underground.
Table 5: Profit Sharing / Additional Basic wage summary. Jul-Oec 1993
(Ordered by the Grade 4 underground percentage difference, froi the highest to the lowest]
Rank Group Mine
1 Anglo Elandsrand
2 Gengold Bracken
3 Gengold Stilfontein
4 Gengold Marievale
5 JCI Sir Albert
6 Gengold Unisel
7 Gengold Leslie
8 Gengold Buffels
9 Randgold Harmony
10 Anglo Western Deep Levels
11 Anglo Freegold
- 12 Gengold Beatrix
13 Anglo Vaal Reefs
14 Gengold Winkelhaak
15 Gengold Kinross
16 GFSA *Gold Fields [BW]
17 Anglovaal *Harties [BW]
18 Randgold B1yvoor
19 Gengold ♦Grootvlei [BW]
20 Gengold *St Helena [BW]
RANGE OF PROFIT SHARE AMOUNTS 
(X of 1991 wage)
Grade 4 
underground
17 .OX 
11 .9X 
9.4X 
8.5X 
NA
4.5X 
3.8X 
3.8X 
3.3X 
3. OX 
2.9X 
2.8X 
2.8X 
2.6X 
2.4X 
2. OX 
2. OX 
1 .6X 
1 . 5X 
1 .5X
[BW] = basic wage increase, no profit share
The most striking aspect of this comparison is that the top five positions 
Include three of the most marginal mines In the country!
i-5N U M  C o l  T i c t l v i  B a r g a i n i n g  D s p a r t a a n t
Table 4: Profit Sharing / Additional Basic wage summary. Jul-Dec 1993
[Ordered by the Grade 4 underground amount, from the highest (Elandsrand) to the lowest (Grootvlei/St Helena) ]
Group Mine RANGE OF PROFIT SHARE AMOUNTS
Minimum Grade 4 Max i mum
rate underground rate
Anglo Elandsrand R e e e R856 R1 236
Gengold Bracken R422 R559 R933
Gengold StiIfontein R346 R442 R671
Gengold Marievale R288 R401 R677
JCX Sir Albert R280 R334 R490
Gengold Unisel R186 R210 R269
Gengold Leslie R189 R178 R204
Gengold Buffels R168 R177 R198
Anglo Western Deep Levels R130 R151 R191
Randgold Harmony*” R148 R150 R153
Anglo Freegold R129 R144 R173
Anglo Vaal Reefs R1 35 R140 R150
Gengold Beatrix R125 R133 R155
Gengold winkelhaak R119 R123 R134
Gengold Kinross R1 12 R112 R112
GFSA •Gold Fields [BW] R50 R100 R 171
Anglovaal •Harties [BW] R57 R99 R183
Randgold Blyvoor R74 R76 R81
Gengold •Grootvlei [BW] R48 R72 R138
Gengold *St Helena [BW] R48 R72 R138
[BW] = basic wage increase, no profit share
Figure 1
PROFIT SHARE/ADDITIONAL BASIC COMPARED 
July - December 1992
Ranked by Rand amount lor Grade 4 UG
Mine
Elandsrand 
Bracken 
Stllfonteln 
Marlevale 
Sir Albert 
U nisei 
Leslie 
Ballels 
Western Deep 
Harmony 
Freehold 
Vaal Reels 
Beatrix 
Wlnkelhaak 
Kinross 
•Gold Fields (BW)
•Harties (BW)
Blyvoor 
•Grootvlel (BW)
*St Helena (BW)
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Rands
* • Basic wacre Increase, no protit share
4. Assessments of the Profit Sharing Schemes
4.1 Comparison with mines that did not Implement profit sharing
St Helena and Grootvlei accepted a 1,5% Increase, rather than the profit 
sharing scheme (because profit payouts in the September quarter would have 
been below this 1,5* level). CVer 6 months, grade 4 underground for 
example, got R72 more in basic wages than on other Gengold mines.
Gold Fields and Anglovaal refused to implement a bonus scheme in 1991 or 
to share profits In 1992. Instead they gave an extra 1* basic wage 
Increase in each of the last two years. Over 6 months in 1992, grade 4 
underground for example, got R100 more in basic wages because of this 
extra 2* increase at Gold Fields and R99 at Harties.
We can compare thesfe results with Table 2 to see whether the profit 
sharing achieved better or worse results than the extra basic wages:
Table 3: Additional Increases at non-profit-sharing mines. Jul-Oec 92
Mine Period RANGE OF ADDITIONAL BASIC WAGES 
[months]
Minimum Grade 4 Maximum
rate underground rate
St Helena [BW] 6 R43 R72 R138
Grootvlei [BW] 6 R4S R72 R138
Gold Fields[BW] 6 R50 R100 R171
Harties [BW] 6 R57 R99 R183
Table 4 and Figure 1 on the next page show that, In most cases, the profit 
sharing schemes provided more extra money that than the additional Increases 
In the basic wages given by Gold Fields and Anglovaal. All Gengold workers on 
profit sharing schemes got more than the 1,5* extra basic increase that was 
given at Grootvlei and St Helena, except for the top grades at Wlnkelhaak and 
Kinross.
*T H U H  C o l  1 « c t 1 vi B a r g a i n i n g  D i p a r t u n t a
An explanation of an example from the table:
Column 2 in Table 2 shows the total cash profit share paid out to a grade 
4 underground worker at each mine for the whole six month period from July 
to December. This Is a good indicator of the average payout to NUM 
members.
In the case of Vaal Reefs, for example:
In the September 1992 quarter. Vaal Reefs paid and equal rand 
share of R51.00. There was no percentage share because the pool 
was too smalI.
In the December 1992 quarter. Vaal Reefs paid out an equal rand 
share of R75 plus 0,5236 of the basic salary of each worker for the 
quarter. The minimum rate for a Grade 4 Underground worker at 
Vaal Reefs is R837 per month. That is R2511 for the three months 
that make up a quarter. 0,5236 of R2511 is R13.05, so the full 
payment for the quarter is R75 plus R13.05. That is R88.05.
So together, in the two quarters, a grade 4 underground worker got 
at least R139.05 - R51.00 plus R88.05.
This is the figure next to Vaal Reefs in Table 2!
(The payout formula for the full six month period is given in 
Table 1)
The other columns in Table 2 shdw the lowest and the highest payouts at 
each mine. Column 1 shows the payout for the minimum wage at each mine. 
Column 3 shows the payout for Grade 8 underground (non-staff) or the 
maximum wage in the bargaining unit at Sir Albert Robinson Hospital.
Note: Payment periods
At Blyvoor, Harmony and Sir Albert Robinson, the payments are made 
monthly. At al I the other mines payments are quarterly. There was one 
payout for the September quarter (paid in November or December, depending 
on the Group) and another payout in January 1993 for the December quarter. 
Future payouts will be made in April and July 1993
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Table 2: Range of Rand Payouts: PROFIT SHARING - JUL TO DEC 1992
This table shows the range of total rand payouts to workers who 
were employed for the enti re six months from June to December 
1992. This is one way of comparing the results between mines.
Co 1 umn 1 Column 2 Column 3
Mine Period
[months]
RANGE OF PROFIT SHARE AMOUNTS
Minimum
rate
Grade 4 
underground
Maximum 
rate
Anglo American
Vaal Reefs 6 R135 R139 R150
Freegold 6 R129 R144 R173
Western Deep 6 R130 R151 R191
Elandsrand 6 R666 R856 R 1 ,236
Randgold
B1yvoor 6 R74 R76 R81
Harmony 6 R148 R150 R153
JCI TPerformance Bonus] -
Sir Albert Rob . 6 R280 NA R490
Gengold
Marievale* 6 R288 R401 R677
Kinross 6 R112 R112 R112
Winkelhaak 6 R 1 19 R123 R134
Buffels 6 R168 R177 R198
Stilfontein* 6 R346 R442 R671
Unisel 6 R186 R21 0 R269
Beatrix 6 R125 R133 R155
Bracken 6 R422 R559 . R933
Leslie 6 R169 R178 R204
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